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THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT: A CASE FOR
EXPANDING ASSIGNEE LIABILITY
Summer Krause*

I.

MARIA SANCHEZ'S STORY

Life was good for Maria Sanchez.1 It was true that since
immigrating to the United States from Mexico, things had
been tough. Raising two children as a single mom and
battling the language barrier had not been easy. But things
were turning around. Although she had to work long hours at
her job at Taco Bell, she had managed to save a lump sum of
money. It was time for her to make her first large purchase,
her very own car! She went to a car dealer in Watsonville, a
small, primarily agricultural town in California, where she
knew the dealer spoke Spanish and would be able to help her.
All she knew about shopping for a car was that she wanted a
mini-van to transport her kids. Maria did not understand the
concept of mileage or "blue book value" and bought a six-yearold Toyota mini-van with 140,000 miles for $18,000 on credit.
Because the transaction had no finance fee2 and zero percent
APR,3 she thought she had made a good deal.
*Senior Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law, 2009; B.A., University of California,
Santa Cruz, 2001. I wish to thank Dori Rose Inda, founder and Executive
Director of the Watsonville Law Center and Professor Eric Wright for their
unwavering dedication and service to the community and for providing the
inspiration for this comment. I also thank my friends and family for their love,
encouragement, and support throughout law school.
1. This hypothetical is based on an interview the author conducted at a
consumer legal advice clinic at the Watsonville Law Center. In 2007, a class
action lawsuit alleging Truth in Lending Act violations was filed against the
dealer. Because of the Truth in Lending Act's limited assignee liability
provision, the law center could not include the finance company in the lawsuit.
2. The finance charge is a broad definition that includes any discernible
cost of credit. RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRUTH IN LENDING 3.01,
at 107 (Robert A. Cook et al. eds., 2000).
3. Annual percentage rate ("APR") is a measure of the cost of credit over
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Three months later, Maria was rear-ended while driving
her car. As a result of the accident, she could not work and
therefore could not continue to make the car payments.
Moreover, she was unable to drive the mini-van. Deciding
that the cost to fix the car was more than its value, the
insurance company sent Maria $9000 reflecting the total blue
book value of the car at the time of purchase. Unsure of how
she would continue to pay off the other $9000, Maria went to
a local law center to ask for help.
After investigation, the law center advised Maria that
the car dealer's failure to disclose how the cost of financing
affected her total purchase price was a Truth in Lending Act
violation. The original blue book value of her car was $9000,
and thus if she had purchased the vehicle with cash, the price
likely would have been the same. By charging Maria $18,000
because she bought the car on credit, rather than $9000 if she
had paid in cash, the dealer hid the finance charge and failed
to disclose to Maria the cost she paid to purchase on credit.
Maria lamented that had she known that she was paying as
much in interest as for the car itself, she would have shopped
for a better deal. Maria also learned that the day she bought
the car, a finance company purchased her $18,000 account for
only $9000. This finance company routinely bought credit
contracts from this dealer and knew that the dealer always
failed to disclose the cost of the finance charge to its
customers.
The law center filed a lawsuit on Maria's behalf alleging
a Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") violation. Unfortunately, the
dealer was insolvent, and it was not possible to recover her
damages from him. Maria asked if she could recover damages
from the finance company since it had continued to collect
from her the full $18,000. The law center, however, informed
her that the finance company, as an assignee,4 was not liable

under the current assignee liability provisions in TILA.
Maria did not understand how the finance company could not
time expressed as a standardized, yearly rate. Id. 914.02, at 179.
4. An assignee is one who has been transferred a right that an assignor
has against an obligor. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.1, at 680 (4th
ed. 2004). In the consumer context, where a retailer or dealer has sold an item
on credit to a consumer, the retailer may assign the right to payment to a
financial institution. Id. This financial institution collects the money from the
consumer and is the assignee. Id. at 680-81.
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be liable because not only did it know that the dealer failed to
disclose the cost of financing to her, but it also profited by
continuing to collect payments from her. In the end, TILA
left Maria Sanchez without a remedy, while the finance
company profited from the dealer's TILA violation.
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act in 1968 with
the goal of compelling lenders to "tell the real story about the
cost of credit."5 However, over forty years later, as Maria
Sanchez's story demonstrates, lenders continue to hide the
"real story" from consumers.
Although TILA's uniform
disclosure requirements created a greater awareness among
consumers about the cost of credit,6 "Truth in Lending has
failed almost entirely in promoting price informed borrowing
decisions among the most vulnerable debtors. In the highcost credit market, structural and market forces act, not to
promote price competition, but to promote confusion and
strategic lending behavior."' Lenders who sell credit at a
high price to people like Maria Sanchez who have poor or no
credit have a greater incentive to obstruct informed price
shopping.'
Due to this incentive, TILA's goal of compelling lenders to
disclose the true cost of financing remains important today.
Broad assignee liability would help attain TILA's purposeforcing creditors to tell the real story about the cost of
credit-because it would ensure that the consumer credit
market polices itself. The effectiveness of broad assignee
provisions is illustrated by the Federal Trade Commission's
Holder Rule (the "Holder Rule"), which expanded assignee
liability for consumer credit transactions,9 and the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act, which expanded
assignee liability for a narrow class of mortgage loans. 10 Yet
under TILA's current provisions, assignees are only liable for
5. Elwin Griffith, Searching for the Truth in Lending: Identifying Some
Problems in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 265,
266 (2000).
6. Elwin Griffith, The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Confronting the
Challenge in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 345,
346 (2003).
7. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost
Consumer Credit: The HistoricalContext of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 807, 890 (2003).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part II.E.2.
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violations apparent on the face of the disclosure statement, 11
and the statute limits the definition of "creditors" to parties to
whom the obligation is initially payable. 2 These provisions
allow assignees to escape liability even if they play an
integral role in the creation of disclosure statements and have
actual or constructive knowledge of TILA violations.' 3
Expanding assignee liability where the assignee has actual or
constructive knowledge of the violation would promote TILA's
purpose by creating greater compliance with TILA's
disclosure requirements.
Not only does limited assignee liability conflict with
TILA's purpose, it also frustrates consumer expectation.
Most finance agreements subject to TILA contain the Federal
14
Trade Commission's Holder Notice (the "Holder Notice").
This notice is a provision in the finance agreement that states
that all of a consumer's claims against the original creditor
are also valid against the assignee.15 This statement to the
consumer creates the expectation of assignee liability where
there are violations by the original creditor.
However,
because TILA does not allow assignee liability for all TILA
violations of an original creditor, courts find that TILA
abrogates the statement of assignee liability in the Holder
Notice.' 6 Yet the addition of a warning adjacent to the Notice,
stating that the assignee may not be liable for some TILA
violations, would comport with consumer expectation.
Assignees should not be able to escape liability for any TILA
violation without such a warning.
This comment begins by outlining the previous state of
finance disclosure standards that necessitated Congress's
enactment of TILA and by describing the goals that Congress
hoped TILA would accomplish.17 Next, this comment gives a
general overview of TILA's assignee liability provision and
disclosure requirements after the Simplification Act.' 8 This
section also outlines assignee liability in the context of the
Holder Rule and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

II.E.1.
II.D.3.
IV.B. 1.
II.C.
II.C.
IV.C. 1.
II.A-B.
II.D-E.
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Act ("HOEPA"), and discuss the policy for expanding assignee
liability in these contexts. 9 Finally, this section delineates
two common TILA violations-the hidden finance charge and
the spurious open-end characterization-where creditor
liability is apparent.2" This comment also highlights that for
these same violations, courts have difficulty imposing
assignee liability where (1) the assignee is involved in
creating the TILA violation yet cannot be classified as an
"original creditor," (2) the assignee has knowledge of the
violation, and (3) the Holder Notice is included in the
contract.2 '
Ultimately, this comment proposes amending TILA to
create assignee liability for all TILA violations unless the
assignee proves that it did not have actual or constructive
knowledge of the violation.22
However, even where an
assignee lacks knowledge and the contract contained the
Holder Notice, this comment proposes that courts should find
that the assignee cannot escape liability unless the assignee
included a warning to consumers in the contract adjacent to
the Holder Notice.23
II. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-TILA: The Problem of Term Inconsistency in the
Credit Market
Prior to the enactment of TILA, no common terminology
existed for describing the terms of consumer credit
transactions.2 4 After World War II and the explosion of
consumer credit use, the varying terms that lenders used to
describe
credit
transactions
became
increasingly
problematic. 25 The terms that described the amount and rate
of finance charges had the least uniformity. 26 As a result of
this discontinuity, consumers did not understand the cost of
19. See infra Parts II.C, II.E.2.
20. See infra Part II.F.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. Peterson, supra note 7, at 875-76.
25. Id. at 876; see also Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 180 (6th Cir.
1941) (illustrating the various non-uniform ways of stating interest rates).
26. NATL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 169
(1972).
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credit, leading some to assume obligations they could not
meet and others unable to seek the best credit pricing.27
State regulation of consumer credit created more confusion by
using many incompatible terms.2"
Besides state regulation, federal agencies also attempted
to deal with the problem of credit term inconsistency. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") required
Ford Motor Company to cease and desist from using the term
"six percent" in its advertising in connection with the cost of a
deferred payment plan for the purchase of its cars. 29 The FTC
found that the use of the term in advertisements caused
consumers to purchase Ford cars under the mistaken belief
that the credit charge was six percent.3 0 The reality was that
if a simple annual interest rate was applied, the interest was
eleven and a half percent.' The court upheld the cease and
desist order, holding that the advertisement had "the
tendency to mislead."32 However, this type of remedy was
inadequate, as it only applied when a creditor voluntarily
advertised the interest rate and was subject to the then
limited jurisdiction of the FTC.33 It was in this setting, where
term inconsistency in the consumer credit market was
rampant, and state and federal agency regulations were
inadequate, that Congress enacted TILA. 4
B. The Enactment and Purposeof TILA
The consumer credit industry raised an array of concerns
after the introduction of the first draft of the Truth in
Lending legislation in 1960.35 Congress debated the Truth in
27. Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973);
Peterson, supra note 7, at 876.
28. Peterson, supra note 7, at 876.

29. Ford Motor Co., 120 F.2d at 177.
30. Id. at 180.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33.

JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 135 (3d

ed. 2007).
34. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 876.
35. Id. at 877. These considerations mostly involved what charges should
be included in the term "interest" and how to calculate the appropriate rate.
SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 33, at 135. Some of the questions raised by the
credit industry included whether a standardized rate computation should be
used, whether the finance charge should be measured by creditor yield or
consumer cost, how to project accurate finance charges in open-end credit
transactions, whether the same rules apply to home mortgages, which
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Lending Act for the next eight years and finally concluded
that due to the complexity and breadth of the statute, a
disclosure law that provided the necessary degree of
specificity could never be drafted.3 6 As a result, Congress
drafted a statute that was relatively clear for typical credit
transactions, but gave the Federal Reserve Board (the
"Board") the power to issue regulations to clarify remaining
3
problems7.
Hence, TILA was enacted in 1968, and the Board
issued Regulation Z ("Reg. Z") in 1969, which is a complete
statement of the compliance responsibilities imposed by
TILA 8 The Board continues to update Reg. Z-to modify,
expand, and refine the obligations imposed by TILA-and to
39
issue a staff commentary to further explain ambiguities.
When enacting TILA, Congress acknowledged how
important consumer credit had become to the American way
of life.4 ° Because borrowing eases the burden of making large
purchases by allowing consumers to make payments over
time, consumers rely heavily on credit.4 1
Accordingly,
Congress declared that consumers have the right to know and
should know the cost of credit in order to make educated
choices.4 2 Congress decided that the "only solution is to
require by legislation" a uniform disclosure method for
finance charges.4 3
The purpose of TILA was to "assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to
him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 44 Furthermore,
Congress found that "economic stabilization would be

transactions were sufficiently "non-consumer" to justify their exclusion from
coverage, and the necessary items of credit information other than the finance
charge necessary to sufficiently inform consumer decision making. ROHNER &
MILLER, supra note 2, $!1.02, at 11.
36. SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 33, at 135. The statute applies to virtually
every form of consumer credit transaction, including home mortgages, small
loans, credit card plans, and even pawn transactions. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. H.R. REP. No. 90-1040, pt. 3, at 3 (1967), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1962, 1964.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1965.
43. Id. at 1970.
44. Truth in Lending Act § 102(a), 15 U.S.C § 1601(a) (2006).
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enhanced and the competition among the various financial
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use
of credit. The informed use of credit results from an
awareness of the cost thereof by consumers."45
Many mandatory disclosure laws are based on the idea
that if consumers are given full and accurate information
regarding the transactions into which they enter, the
marketplace will function more efficiently. 4
Requiring
disclosures allows consumers to make informed decisions for
themselves from among competing products and suppliers.47
This results in less need for substantive regulation of
consumer transactions. 4
Because TILA employs market
mechanisms rather than price ceilings,49 which economists
oppose, it has become "the cornerstone of consumer credit
regulation." 0
C. The FTC HolderRule
Apart from TILA, there are other mechanisms that
regulate the consumer credit market. In 1975, the FTC
promulgated the Holder Rule with the goal of protecting
consumers from a traditional contract doctrine that insulated
many assignees of consumer credit transactions to the
detriment of consumers. 1
Many consumer credit

45. Id.
46. SPANOGLE ETAL., supra note 33, at 124.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Price ceilings regulate the interest rate directly, imposing a substantive
limitation. DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 1.1, at 4
(Thompson/West 2006) (1990).
50. Id. ("The price ceiling concept has come under attack by economists as
an unwarranted interference with the price mechanism in the market for
consumer credit. Truth in Lending has the advantage of simply giving the
consumer the relevant information, and then letting the market itself yield
competitive credit prices through the process of individual consumers striving to
achieve the best buy in credit."); see also Peterson, supra note 7, at 881 ("In
retrospect, Congress'[s] adoption of TILA was only possible because the price
disclosure approach has distinct political and theoretical advantages over other
consumer credit policy options. In theory, disclosure simultaneously provides
consumer protection and promotes market outcomes consistent with the
conditions classical economics prescribes for efficient market economies. This
characteristic makes the disclosure approach unusually attractive in the
American political climate.").
51. SPANOGLE ETAL., supra note 33, at 584-85.
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transactions that are subject to TILA are also subject to the
Holder Rule.52 When a transaction is subject to TILA as well
as the Holder Rule, questions arise as to how these two
mechanisms
of consumer credit regulation interact with each
3
5

other.

A long-standing commercial doctrine under traditional
contract law protects the "holder in due course."54 If an
assignee is classified as a holder in due course,55 the assignee
is subject only to a limited list of "real defenses" 56 and takes
the assignment free of personal claims and defenses,57
including many of the most important defenses for
consumers.55 Essentially, the holder in due course doctrine
"is a collection of legal traditions and rules and commercial
practices which merge into a single result: the insulation of
financers from consumer claims. "59
The application of the holder in due course doctrine
became a focus of criticism."
Critics noted that it was
becoming increasingly difficult to justify why the doctrine
"requires that a hard-pressed wage-earner who has been
bilked by a now-insolvent seller into buying junk . . . must

pay the full price to a bank or finance company whose own
relationship with the fraudulent seller has been intimate,
long-continued, and profitable." 61 Therefore, the Holder Rule
52. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, at 859.

53. See id.
54. SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 33, at 584.

55. To be classified as a holder in due course, an assignee must be (1) a
holder (2) of a negotiable instrument who took it (3) for value (4) in good faith
and (5) without notice of certain problems with the instrument. JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-2, at 509 (5th
ed. 2000).
56. So-called "real defenses" are limited to (1) infancy; (2) duress, lack of
legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction; (3) fraud that induced the obligor
to sign the instrument without knowing its terms and without reasonable
opportunity to find them out; and (4) discharge of the obligor through
insolvency. Id. § 14-10, at 542.
57. Personal defenses include "failure or lack of consideration, breach of
warranty, unconscionability, and garden variety fraud." Id. at 543. These
personal defenses are more applicable for consumer protection than are the real
defenses. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2233 (2007).
58. Peterson, supra note 57, at 2231.
59. Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions:
Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 567 (1975).
60. SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 33, at 584.
61. Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
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required that all financers of consumer goods or services
include a legend, the Holder Notice, in their contracts stating
that all of the consumer's claims and defenses are preserved
against the assignee.2 This legend states that any assignee
of the original lender takes the contract subject to all claims
and defenses that the consumer might have asserted against
the original lender." The legend includes a damage cap that
limits the assignee's liability to no more than the amount the
borrower has paid under the assigned obligation.' In loans
governed by the Holder Rule, the original lender commits an
unfair or deceptive trade practice if its contract fails to
65
include the Holder Notice.
In its Statement of Basis and Purpose, the FTC
articulated an economically-oriented rationale for adopting
the Holder Rule, stating that its primary focus was the
distribution or allocation of costs occasioned by seller
misconduct. 66 The concern was that a system that divorced a
consumer's obligation to pay from the seller's obligation to
perform completely allocated the cost to the consumer. The
FTC found that consumers are not in a position to evaluate
whether seller misconduct exists in a particular transaction. 8
Without assignee liability, the cost of seller misconduct is not

YALE L.J. 1057, 1098 (1954).
Many of these critics were consumer
representatives. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 55, § 14-9, at 533 ("Those
representatives correctly argued that the consumer was often left holding the
bag, when, for example [the consumer] received shoddy house siding and signed
a . . . retail installment contract ....
The note or contract could quickly be
transferred to a legitimate lender who would then insist upon full payment.
Since the lender would be a holder in due course . . . the consumer could not
raise the legitimate defenses she might have, and would have to pay
notwithstanding her failure to receive what she bargained for. In such a case
her recourse against the house-sider, who had since moved on to a new town
was not satisfactory. Either she could not find the house-sider, or the housesider would be insolvent.").
62. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2
(2009). Because the legend gives notice of the preservation of defenses, the
legend itself is referred to as the Holder Notice, while the inclusion requirement
is called the Holder Rule.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Statement of Basis
and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,522 (Nov. 18, 1975).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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transferred back to the seller.69
Thus, this cost is
"externalized in a way that renders many sales finance
transactions inherently deceptive and misleading."70
The FTC contemplated that by internalizing seller
misconduct costs, the Holder Rule would more accurately
reflect the societal costs of a credit transaction.71 The FTC
found that "[als a practical matter, the creditor is always in a
better position than the buyer to return seller misconduct
costs to sellers, the guilty party. This is the real location
desired, a return of costs to the party who generates them." 2
There are four reasons why this is so. 73 The first is that the

creditor "engages in many transactions where consumers deal
infrequently."74 Second, the creditor "has access to a variety
of information systems which are unavailable to
consumers."75 Third, a creditor "has recourse to contractual
devices that render the routine return of seller misconduct
costs to sellers relatively cheap and automatic." 76

Fourth,

"the creditor possesses the means to initiate a lawsuit and
prosecute it to judgment where recourse to the legal system is
necessary."77 The FTC also found that the risk reallocation
inherent in the Holder Rule would discourage predatory
practices and schemes because creditors would "simply not
accept the risks generated by the truly unscrupulous
merchant. The market will be policed in this fashion and all
78
parties will benefit accordingly."

D. The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act
1. The Impetus for Reform
Soon after the enactment of TILA, Congress realized that
an amendment to simplify TILA and its required disclosures
69. Id. at 53,522-23.
70. Id. at 53,523.

71. Id.
72. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Statement of Basis
and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, at 53,523 (Nov. 18, 1975).

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

77. Id.

78. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, Statement of Basis
and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, at 53,523 (Nov. 18, 1975).

1164

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:49

was necessary to accomplish its goals. The three basic goals
of the original version of TILA were to stabilize the market, to
enable consumers to shop for the best credit, and to protect
consumers against unfair billing.79 TILA aimed to accomplish
these goals by requiring creditors to disclose the annual
percentage rate on all consumer transactions."0 The annual
percentage rate is expressed as "the yearly interest on the
loan, together with all other charges 'incident to the extension
of credit,' as a percentage of the average balance."81 The
legislature hoped that this credit term would provide a
uniform "yardstick" for comparison of interest rates. 2
However, the statute and its accompanying interpretations
were technically complex, making it difficult for creditors to
comply with and for consumers to comprehend.8 3 These
concerns resulted in the Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act (the "Simplification Act"), which amended TILA
to the form that generally now reflects the current state of the
law.84
2. A General Overview of the CurrentLaw
The Simplification Act reduced and streamlined the
disclosures for closed-end transactions.8 " The Simplification
Act requires creditors to group together all mandatory
disclosures and to set them off from other terms of the
contract, thereby isolating the disclosures from any unrelated
information.8 6 This change allowed the Board to draft "model
forms," which, if used, demonstrate compliance with TILA,
thus creating the streamlined and now well-known disclosure
79. Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth
in Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 233 (1991) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1602(a) (1988))
(critiquing the legislative drafting process of TILA).
80. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1606).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing 107 CONG. REC. 6854 (1961) (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
83. Ralph J. Rohner, Truth in Lending "Simplified": Simplified?, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 999, 1005-06 (1981).
84. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96221, 94 Stat. 168 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
85. Rohner, supra note 83, at 1008. Closed-end credit is traditionally
thought of as consumer credit transactions, involving direct loans and
installment credit sales of goods or services, where credit is repayable over a
fixed term. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, $ 5.01, at 245. Reg. Z defines
"closed-end credit" as "consumer credit other than open-end credit." Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10) (2008).
86. Rohner, supra note 83, at 1015.
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statement. 7
A TILA disclosure is required for any extension of
"consumer credit" 8 by a "creditor." 9
If a disclosure is
required, TILA differentiates between "open-end" and "closedend" credit.9" The main differences between open-end and
closed-end credit is in the nature of the transaction.9 1 In a
closed-end transaction, there is a single transaction and all
elements are determinable at the outset.9 2 Through the
disclosures, the consumer should clearly understand the total
amount to be paid. 93 By contrast, consumers in open-end
transactions such as credit cards are never given a complete
"forward-looking" view of the transaction. While open-end
creditors are required to provide initial and ongoing periodic
disclosures, the continually evolving nature of the transaction
prevents consumers from determining the total cost of credit
at the time of entering into the contract. 94
3.

Change in the Definition of Creditor

Prior to the Simplification Act, courts varied on who to
classify as the original creditor and on what obligations to
impose.9 5
The 1968 version of TILA defined the term
"creditor" as one "who in the ordinary course of business
regularly extends or arranges for the extension of consumer
credit, or offers to extend or arrange for the extensions of
such credit ..... 9 Because "dealers and assignees routinely
87. Id.
88. Consumer credit is defined as credit " 'primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes.'" RoHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, T 2.04, at 64 (quoting
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12)).
89. A creditor is a person who "regularly" extends consumer credit (defined
as more than twenty-five non-mortgage transactions in the preceding calendar
year) that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in
more than four installments and to whom the obligation is initially payable. 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17).
90. SPANOGLE ET AL., supra note 33, at 136-37.
91. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, T 5.01, at 247.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Rohner, supra note 83, at 1011 ("It is clear however, that, in fact,
dealers and assignees routinely collaborate to generate consumer paper, and
direct lenders depend on referrals from dealers and brokers. Who, here, extends
the credit and who arranges it? Who must be identified, and who can be sued
for violations? This situation led to considerable judicial freelancing on deciding
what responsibilities rested on whom.").
96. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (2008).
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collaborate to generate consumer paper," this issue had been
litigated many times. "
In this legislative environment, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that where an assignee is intricately
involved in the original transaction, the assignee is liable for
TILA violations not under the assignee liability provision, but
as an original creditor. The Supreme Court's reasoning in
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance illustrates why it was
logical to find that the seller and the assignee were both
original creditors.98 In Cenance, a Ford dealership assigned a
purchaser's credit application to Ford Motor Credit Co.
("FMCC") prior to the completion of the transaction.9 9 The
dealer regularly dealt with this assignee and FMCC had to
approve the finance instrument before the dealer extended
credit.10
FMCC prepared the credit application form and
conditioned the transaction upon the acceptance of the credit
application by FMCC.' 0 '
The Court relied on the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Meyers v. Clearview to determine that FMCC was a statutory
creditor. In Meyers, the assignee, although involved in the
original transaction, wasn't assigned the contract until after
the completion of the transaction. 10 2 The court held that the
finance company was an original creditor and reasoned that
"in some consumer credit transactions there are multiple
'creditors,' a credit arranger and a credit extender. Where
there is a credit arranger there must obviously be a credit
extender, and both are original creditors under the Act and
Regulation Z." 0 3 Like the Meyers court, the Supreme Court
in Cenance focused on the dealer as an arranger of credit and
FMCC as the extender of credit.' °4 Accordingly, the Court
97. Rohner, supra note 83, at 1011.
98. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 157 (1981).
99. Id. at 156.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 157.
102. Id. at 156-57 (analyzing Meyers v. Clearview, 539 F.2d 511, 515 (5th
Cir. 1976)) ("'The Meyers analysis applies with even greater force to the instant
situation ....' " (citations omitted)). FMCC had a higher degree of involvement
in the original transaction than the finance company in Meyers since the entire
transaction depended upon FMCC's approval. Id.
103. Meyers, 539 F.2d at 515; see also PRIDGEN, supra note 49, § 5:16, at 314
("In other words, the dealer was viewed as a mere conduit or arranger of credit,
while the real creditor was the third party financier.").
104. Cenance, 452 U.S. at 158 ("The facts negate any suggestion that the
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held that both the dealer and the assignee were original
creditors liable for TILA violations and reasoned that it would
be "elevating form over substance to conclude that FMCC is
not a creditor within the meaning of the Act."' °
Despite the Supreme Court's opinion in Cenance,
Congress redefined the definition of creditor in the
Simplification Act. 106 After the Simplification Act, TILA
states that a creditor is defined as one that regularly extends
consumer credit and is "the one to whom the debt arising
from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable...
on the face of the [note]."1"7

The commentary to Reg. Z

specifically declares that the dealer is the creditor even if the
dealer simultaneously assigns the obligation. 10 8 Thus, after
Congress changed the definition of creditor, a court can no
longer find that an assignee is an original creditor, even on
the exact facts of Cenance where the assignee generated the
consumer paper containing the TILA violation.
E. Assignee Liability under TILA
1. Generally
By narrowing the definition of creditor, the Simplification
Act significantly limits assignee liability.' 9 Prior to the
Simplification Act, many courts found an assignee liable for
TILA violations because the assignees were "creditors"
However, under the current statute,
themselves.1
consumers must rely on TILA's assignee liability provision in
order to assert TILA violations against an assignee."1 TILA's
assignee provision creates assignee liability for only those
dealers anticipated financing any of these transactions.").
105. Id.
106. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96221, 94 Stat. 168 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f)).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (2006).
108. Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I,
subpart A, cmt. 2(a)(17)(i)(2) (2008).
109. See supra Part II.D.3.
110. Rohner, supra note 83, at 1011. Cenance is one example. By classifying
an assignee as an original creditor, the Court did not need to look to the
assignee provisions of TILA. See Cenance, 452 U.S. at 157-58. However, after
the change in definition of creditor, courts could no longer hold assignees liable
as original creditors and had to look to the assignee provision in TILA in order
to find assignees liable for TILA violations.
111. See Truth in Lending Act § 131, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2006).

1168

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:49

violations "apparent on the face of the disclosure
statement."11 2 TILA gives two non-exclusive examples of
violations that are apparent on the face of the document: a
disclosure determined to be incomplete or inaccurate, and a
disclosure that does not use the terms supplied in TILA."'
Other changes to TILA further limit assignee liability.
Before the Simplification Act, the assignee liability clause
provided for assignee liability when there was a violation on
the face of the contract "without [the assignee's] knowledge to
the contrary.""
The phrase "without knowledge to the
contrary" arguably included liability for an assignee who had
knowledge of the violation." 5 The Simplification Act removed
the phrase "without knowledge to the contrary," seeming to
provide for assignee liability only where the violation is on
the face of the document. 1 6 Although most consumers must
look to this section of TILA to determine assignee liability, it
is not the only place that addresses the subject of assignee
liability in consumer credit contracts."'
2. HOEPA'sAssignee Liability
Although Congress originally created a very limited
assignee liability provision for TILA, in 1994 Congress
112. Id. When a consumer seeks money damages under section 1640 in a
transaction that is not secured by real property, the assignee is liable only for
those disclosures which are apparent on the face of the documents assigned. Id.
§ 1641(a). In the case of a transaction secured by real property, the assignee is
liable if the violation is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement when
compared to the note, to any itemization of the amount financed, or to any other
disclosure disbursement. Id. § 1641(e). These rules do not apply to involuntary
assignees. Id. § 1641(a).
113. Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (1979) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2006)) ("In
any action or proceeding by or against any subsequent assignee of the original
creditor without knowledge to the contrary by the assignee when he acquires
the obligation, written acknowledgement of receipt by a person to whom a
statement is required to be given pursuant to this subchapter shall be
conclusive proof of delivery thereof and, unless the violation is apparent on the
face of the statement, of compliance with this part.").
115. See id.
116. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96221, 94 Stat. 182 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2006)). The removal
of this language has made some courts find that Congress intended actual
knowledge to be independent of what can be discovered from the face of the
document, and thus insufficient to trigger assignee liability. E.g., Ramadan v.
Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2000).
117. See infra Part II.E.2.
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explicitly recognized that expanded assignee liability can be a
powerful mechanism for the private enforcement of the
TILA's provisions. 1 ' Due to the wide-spread epidemic of
lending abuses in the mortgage market Congress expanded
TILA's assignee liability for a limited group of high-interest
and high-fee home equity loans." 9 Congress intended that
broader assignee liability would enforce compliance with
TILA and encourage assignees to police the primary mortgage
market.

120

In 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), which amended TILA and
created a duty on the secondary market of lenders to restrain
predatory lending practices.' 2 ' HOEPA creates a special class
of high-cost mortgages that are subject to additional
regulation. 122 Mortgage loans are covered by HOEPA if their
terms exceed a certain price threshold.' 23 Where a loan is
covered by HOEPA, an assignee "steps squarely into the
shoes of the creditor" and is liable for all claims and
defenses. 24 An assignee's only defense is to prove that a
reasonable person who exercised due diligence could not have
determined that the mortgage exceeded HOEPA's price
threshold based on the loan documents. 25
In enacting HOEPA, the Senate reported that in
118. See Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of
1994: Extending Liability for PredatorySubprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage
Market Participants,18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 151-52 (2005).

119. Id.; Peterson, supra note 57, at 2241 ("HOEPA goes further than any
other federal statute in creating assignee liability for predatory mortgage
lending.").
120. See Keyfetz, supra note 118, at 151-52.
121. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d) (2006)). The
term "predatory lending" describes the practice of loan originators of subprime
mortgages who use manipulative techniques like fraud and deception to extend
credit in ways intended to strip borrowers of the equity in their homes. Keyfetz,
These loans come with terms that are so
supra note 118, at 153.
disadvantageous to the borrower that there is little likelihood that the borrower
can repay the loan, thus resulting in an unreasonable risk of foreclosure. Id. at
153-54. Over the last decade, there has been tremendous growth in the amount
of predatory lending, which has resulted in an extremely high number of
foreclosures in a very short period of time. Id. at 158.
122. Peterson, supra note 57, at 2226 (citing DEE PRIDGEN, supra note 49,
§ 9:25).
123. Id.
124. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2,

125. Id.

12.06, at 858.

1170

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1:49

expanding assignee liability it would "ensure that the High
Cost Mortgage market polices itself.... [W]ith loans sold on
a regular basis, one unscrupulous player can create havoc in
a community by selling loans as fast as they are originated.
Providing assignee liability will halt the flow of capital to
such lenders." 2 ' Assignee liability links the parties involved
in the mortgage production, forcing those who feed capital to
predatory lenders to internalize the costs imposed on
consumers.' 27 Congress further reported that it intended this
amendment to mirror the FTC Holder Rule. 128 Congress
reasoned that since the FTC Holder Rule had neither
restricted the flow of consumer credit nor interfered with the
securitization of auto loans, HOEPA would not either.129
F. CreditorLiability for Common Truth in Lending
Violations
When a transaction is subject to TILA, the creditor must
disclose the cost of financing to the consumer and the failure
to do so violates the law. 3 °
Despite TILA's disclosure
requirements, creditors continue to evade disclosing the true
cost of credit to consumers.' 3' There are many manners in
which creditors continue to violate TILA.'3 2 This section will
discuss two of the common TILA violations-the hidden
finance charge, and the spurious characterization of open-end
3
credit.' 1
1.

The Hidden Finance Charge

To escape TILA's disclosure requirements, many
creditors "hide the finance charge" by increasing the price of
the item while stating that there is no finance charge. 34 Soon
126. S. REP. No. 103-169, at 28 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1881, 1912.
127. Keyfetz, supra note 118, at 169.
128. Id. at 182 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 1912).
129. S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 1912 ("The F.T.C. rule has not significantly
restricted the flow of consumer credit and or interfered with the securitization
of auto loans.").
130. See supra Part II.D.2.
131. See infra Parts II.F.1-2.
132. See generally James Lockhart, What Constitutes "FinanceCharge"under
§ 106(a) of the Truth in Lending Act or Applicable Regulations, 154 A.L.R. FED.
431 (1999).
133. See infra Parts II.F. 1-2.
134. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973);
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after the enactment of TILA, the Supreme Court recognized
the inclination of creditors to "bury the cost of credit" by
hiding finance charges in a transaction. 135 In Mourning v.
Family Publications Service, Inc., the Court upheld the
Board's authority to promulgate the "four installment rule"
under Reg. Z. 136 The four installment rule requires TILA
disclosures in consumer credit transactions either when a
debt is paid in more than four installments or if there is a
finance charge.1 3 ' The Court confirmed the Board's authority
to create the four-installment rule because it was reasonably
related to the TILA's objectives and because the Board needed
to be prepared for the "subterfuges" that creditors might use
to avoid TILA.138 The Court stated that Congress was clearly
aware that merchants may try to avoid giving disclosures by
39
concealing credit charges.
Despite the promulgation of the four installment rule,
hidden finance charges continue to be a pervasive TILA
violation. 4 ° Although disclosure statements are required if
there are to be more than four installment payments,
creditors still avoid disclosing the cost of credit by inflating
the price of an item and giving the required disclosure, but
then listing the finance charge as less than it is or not listing
a finance charge at all.'
TILA defines a finance charge as the sum of all charges
Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 112 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 1997); Yazzie
v. Reynolds, 623 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1980); In re Stewart, 93 B.R. 878 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988).
135. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 366-67 ("One means of circumventing the
objectives of the Truth in Lending Act, as passed by Congress, was that of
'burying' the cost of credit in the price of goods sold. Thus in many credit
transactions in which creditors claimed that no finance charge had been
imposed, the creditor merely assumed the cost of extending credit as an expense
of doing business, to be recouped as part of the price charged in the transaction.
Congress was well aware, from its extensive studies, of the possibility that
merchants could use such devices to evade the disclosure requirements of the
Act.
The Committee hearings are replete with suggestions that such
manipulation would render the Act a futile gesture in the case of goods
normally sold by installment contract.").
136. Id. at 368-69.
137. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17) (2008).
138. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 371.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Gibson v. Bob Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 112 F.3d 283 (7th
Cir. 1997); Yazzie v. Reynolds, 623 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1980); In re Stewart, 93
B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
141. See, e.g., Yazzie, 623 F.2d 638.
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directly or indirectly imposed by the creditor as an incident to
the extension of credit. 142 A charge is a finance charge if it 4is
of a type not payable in a comparable cash transaction. 1
Courts hold that a hidden finance charge is a TILA violation
where the charge is "separately imposed." 14' In Gibson v. Bob
Watson Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., the transaction included an
extended warranty. 145 The TILA disclosure showed that the
dealer paid the entire amount for the warranty to a thirdparty warrantor, but in fact, the dealer retained a portion of
the payment. 46 The court held that the dealer had violated
TILA if it had systematically marked up the price for an
extended warranty in credit transactions without disclosing it
as a finance charge.4 7
This concealment deprived the
consumer of making an intelligent choice and led her to
believe that she had to pay the additional fee for the extended
warranty regardless of whether she paid in cash or credit. 141
The hidden finance charge violation has occurred in many
different contexts and
has been a prevalent violation since the
49
inception of TILA.1
2. Spurious Open-End Credit Transactions
Another common TILA violation is where a creditor
spuriously characterizes a transaction as open-end rather
than closed-end. 150 Transactions characterized as open-end
require periodic disclosures because they contemplate
repeated extensions of credit by the creditor.' 5 ' On the other
hand, with closed-end transactions there is only one extension
of credit and therefore disclosure of the total finance charge,
142. Truth in Lending Act § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2006).
143. Id.
144. Griffith, supra note 5, at 277.
145. Gibson, 112 F.3d at 284.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 287.
148. Id.
149. See Lockhart, supra note 132, § 5. Hidden finance charges have been
addressed in a variety of contexts: discounts to cash customers or surcharges to
non-cash customers; license, title, and registration fees; attorneys fees; credit
application fees; courier or delivery fees; handling or service charges; late
charges; membership fees; retained amounts listed as other fees; and discount
or holdback in assignment of commercial paper. Id.
150. See, e.g., Meyers v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1225
(M.D. Ala. 2001); Long v. Fidelity Water Sys., No. C-97-20118 RMW, 2000 WL
760328 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2000).
151. See supra Part II.D.2.
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the total number of payments, and the amount financed is
required. 15 2 In cases involving closed-end transactions, some
creditors try to avoid giving the comprehensive closed-end
disclosures by framing the transaction as an open-end credit
transaction, thereby avoiding disclosure of the total finance
charge.153 In an attempt to prevent this behavior, Congress
revised the definition of open-end credit in the Simplification
Act. 154
Under the current law, creditors must have a
reasonable expectation of repeated transactions with the
consumer in order to classify a credit transaction as open-

end. 155
Despite this revision, the issue of spurious open-end
credit characterization appeared in a number of cases in the
1990s.1 56
In Meyers v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., the
transaction involved the purchase of a satellite dish. 7 The
seller told Meyers, the consumer, that he could pay the
satellite dish off in two years at the rate of $59.55 a month."15
The dealer classified the transaction as open-end with the
proper disclosures and issued the consumer a credit card to
purchase the satellite system. 5 9 When the bill came, the
consumer realized that the transaction could not be paid off
in the amount of time stated because the stated charges did
Thus, because the
not include the cost of financing. 60
creditor did not make the closed-end disclosures, the
consumer did not understand the true cost of the
transaction.1 61 The creditor argued that since the satellite
programming would only last one year, it reasonably believed
that customers would make repeat purchases on the card,
which was why they characterized the transactions as openend. "6' 2 The court found that due to the factual circumstances
of the case, particularly that the defendant did not operate
152. See supra Part II.D.2.
153. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, 5.01, at 249.
154. Id. at 248-49. Previously, the prospect of repeat transactions only had
to be possible. Id.
155. Truth in Lending Act §103, 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
156. SPANOGLE ETAL., supra note 33, at 156.
157. Meyers v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1227 (M.D.
Ala. 2001).
158. Id.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1230.
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retail stores where additional programming could be
purchased, it was not presumptively reasonable for the
creditor to expect repeat transactions
and thus to
163
characterize the transaction as open-end.

III.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

Congress enacted TILA in 1968 with the purpose of
enhancing
economic
stabilization
and
strengthening
competition among various financial institutions through the
informed use of credit. 164
Currently, TILA provides for
liability of an original creditor for many of the common TILA
violations like the hidden finance charge and the spurious
characterization of a transaction as open-end. 65 However,
TILA imposes assignee liability only when the violation is
"apparent on the face of the disclosure statement," and after
the Simplification Act, an assignee may not be defined as an
original creditor even where it is intricately involved in the
original transaction.16
Yet, in 1994, through HOEPA,
Congress expanded assignee liability for some mortgages in
order to respond to and rectify the problems created by
predatory lending in the mortgage market.'6 7
Like the problem of predatory lending in the context of
mortgages, TILA's narrow assignee liability provision creates
problems in the consumer credit market. Broader assignee
liability, similar to HOEPA, could rectify this problem. The

163. Meyers v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1231-32
(M.D. Ala, 2001). Courts are split on whether the mischaracterization of openend credit transactions is appropriate for summary judgment. See id.; Long v.

Fidelity Water Sys., No. C-97-20118 RMW, 2000 WL 760328 (N.D. Cal. March
16, 2000); Benion v. Bank One, Dayton, N.A., 144 F.3d 1056 (7th Cir. 1998). In
Benion v. Bank One, Dayton, N.A., the court granted summary judgment for the
defendant since the credit card could be used to buy related goods. Id. at 1060.
The court acknowledged that this mischaracterization was an "abuse of the
open-end credit provision" but declined to find so in its holding because "courts
should generally leave the plugging of loopholes" to the Federal Reserve Board.
If the Federal Reserve Board cannot formulate such a rule as an expert in its
administrative discretion, then the court "surely cannot formulate it as a matter
of statutory interpretation." Id. at 1059. Thus, although courts may decline to
find overt TILA violations in this context, they do so not on the grounds that
this mischaracterization is not an abuse of the truth in lending principles but
instead as a matter of statutory interpretation. See id.
164. See supra Part II.B.
165. See supra Part II.F.
166. See supra Parts II.E.1, II.D.3.
167. See supra Part II.E.2.
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narrow definition of creditor and the limited scope of assignee
liability create problems in several ways. First, the revised
definition of creditor allows assignees who play an integral
role in creating a TILA violation to escape liability. 16 Second,
Congress's omission of the phrase "without knowledge to the
contrary" from the assignee liability provision implies that an
assignee may have knowledge of a TILA violation in an
assigned contract and still escape liability. 169 Third, TILA's
limitation of assignee liability directly contradicts the Holder
Notice that is included in all contracts for consumer goods
and services, and thus frustrates consumer expectation. 70
Finally, narrowing assignee liability contradicts the goal and
purpose of TILA, which is 7 to promote the meaningful
disclosure of the cost of credit.' '
A. The Definition of CreditorAllows Assignees That
Participatein Creating TILA Violations to Escape Liability
An assignee may escape liability even where it
participates in creating the violation because of TILA's
amended definition of creditor. The amendment resulted
from the differing interpretations by the courts regarding
whether they could define an assignee as an original
creditor. 172 Although the amended definition does clarify that
the disclosure responsibility clearly rests with the seller and
73
stops the differing interpretations, it leads to an absurdity.
Can a dealer really be considered an "original creditor" when
all it does is arrange for the immediate assignment of the
contract?"7 "Even though the note or contract initially may
be payable to the dealer, theoretically-and as a matter of
economics-the party whose money is at risk is the
financer." 75
Thus, in its quest for simplicity, Congress
redefined creditor in a way that allows an assignee to be
intricately involved in the original transaction, like FMCC
was in the Cenance case, yet completely escape assignee

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part III.D.
Rohner, supra note 83, at 1010.
Id. at 1012-13.
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1012.
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liability because it is not the party to whom the note is
17 6
originally payable.
B. TILA Allows Assignees with Knowledge of the Violation to
Escape Liability
An assignee who has knowledge of a violation can escape
liability because of TILA's narrow assignee liability provision.
TILA limits assignee liability to only those violations that are
apparent on the face of the disclosure statement. 177 With the
Simplification Act, Congress removed the phrase "without
knowledge to the contrary." 17 Therefore, it would seem that
an assignee will escape liability where the violation is not
apparent on the face of the contract, even where the assignee
has knowledge-either constructive or actual-of a violation.
The principles that favor limiting assignee liability do not
arise where an assignee knows of a violation. Congress
narrowed assignee liability based on the principle that an
assignee should not be liable where it can neither detect nor
control the violation. 1 79 In essence, creating assignee liability
where the violation is apparent on the face of the document
only allows for liability of an assignee who would have known
of the violation had it examined the disclosure.'
This
creates no duty on the part of an assignee to look beyond the
disclosure.' 8 ' Given the rationale for limiting an assignee's
liability-i.e., no duty of inquiry and no liability for violations
that an assignee cannot control-the lack of liability for an
182
assignee when it has knowledge of a violation is illogical.
The concerns that actuate the limitation are void because the
assignee has no duty of inquiry; it already knows of the
violation and it has control since it can easily decide not to

176. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155 (1981).
177. Truth In Lending Act § 131, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2006).
178. See id.
179. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, $l12.06, at 854.
180. See id. ("Congress also realized that assignees were simply not in a
position to guarantee TIL compliance by the assignor in all respects, and that
the assignee's ability to police the creditor's practices was largely limited to
providing proper forms and then reviewing the accuracy and completeness of
the disclosure statements that accompanied the assigned paper.").
181. Griffith, supra note 5, at 314 ("The plain language of the statute does
not require a resort to matters outside the disclosure statement or documents
assigned.").
182. Id. at 317.
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take the contract. 8 3

C. TILA's Interaction with the Holder Rule Frustrates
Consumer Expectation
TILA's assignee liability rule contradicts consumer
expectation of assignee liability because it is in opposition
with the statement in the Holder Notice. The Holder Rule
requires credit sellers to include in all consumer credit
contracts a clause stating that the holder of the contract (the
assignee) is subject to all claims that the debtor could assert
against the original creditor." 4 Yet TILA's assignee liability
provision states that an assignee is not subject to all claims
the debtor could assert against the original creditor, but
rather only those that are apparent on the face of the
contract. 85 Thus, while the contract states that the assignee
is liable for all TILA violations the consumer could assert
against the original creditor, TILA states that the assignee is
not liable.
D. TILA's Limited Assignee Liability Is at Odds with Its
Policy and Goals
TILA's limitation of assignee liability directly conflicts
with the purpose of TILA. Congress enacted TILA with a
simple goal-to ensure the meaningful disclosure of the cost
of credit.8 6 Allowing assignees to escape liability is at odds
with this purpose because holding assignees liable would help
ensure the disclosure of the cost of credit to consumers. As
indicated by Congress's analysis in enacting HOEPA and the
FTC's reasoning for promulgating the Holder Rule, an
assignee has the ability to spread the cost of violations and
police the market, thus ensuring that creditors comply with
TILA's requirements.'87 Therefore, Congress's limitation of
assignee liability directly undercuts the aims of TILA by not
employing other means of ensuring creditor compliance.

183. See id.
184. Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2
(2009).
185. Truth In Lending Act § 131, 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (2006).
186. See supra Part II.B.
187. See supra Parts II.C, II.E.2.
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IV. TILA'S LIMITED ASSIGNEE LIABILITY PROVISION
FRUSTRATES TILA's PURPOSE
In light of TILA's goal of compelling lenders to disclose
the true cost of financing, Congress should not have created
such limited assignee liability. Broad assignee liability helps
attain TILA's purpose because it ensures that the consumer
credit market polices itself. The effectiveness of broad
assignee provisions is illustrated by the FTC's promulgation
of the Holder Rule and Congress's expansion of assignee
8
liability with HOEPA."'
Yet under TILA's current
provisions, assignees are liable for very few violations"8 9 and
the definition of creditor is limited to parties to which the
This section will
obligation is initially payable.' 9
demonstrate that these provisions permit assignees to escape
liability even where they play an integral role in the creation
of disclosure statements and have actual or constructive
knowledge of TILA violations.' 91
Moreover, not only does limited assignee liability conflict
with TILA's purpose, it also frustrates consumer
expectations. Because most finance agreements subject to
TILA contain the Holder Notice, 92 consumers expect assignee
liability where there are violations by the original creditor.
This section also will analyze how many courts allow
assignees to escape liability by finding that TILA abrogates
93
the statement of assignee liability in the Holder Notice.
Original creditors may be liable for many common TILA
violations like the hidden finance charge or the
mischaracterization of open-end credit,' 94 yet the extent of
liability of assignees for these prevalent violations is not as
clear. "9' 5 Basic violations such as the failure to give TILA
disclosures, the presence of mathematical errors or blanks on
the form, and the failure to use the required terminology are
considered to be apparent on the face of the document and
clearly give rise to assignee liability. 196 However, most TILA
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See supra Parts II.C, II.E.2.
See supra Part II.E.1.
See supra Part II.D.3.
See infra Parts IV.A-B.
See supra Part II.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part II.F.
See infra Parts IV.A-B.
ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2,

12.06, at 855.
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violations are not so straightforward.
The question of
assignee liability is especially difficult where (1) the assignee
is involved in creating the TILA violation yet cannot be
classified as an "original creditor," (2) the assignee has
knowledge of the violation, and (3) the Holder Notice is
included in the contract. 197
A. The Definition of Creditor
By changing the definition of creditor with the
Simplification Act, Congress undeniably intended to limit
assignee liability. 198 However, it is questionable whether
Congress foresaw that its efforts to clarify TILA would protect
assignees that play an integral role in TILA violations.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Cenance demonstrates
that it is logical to find assignee liability for TILA violations
when the assignee is intricately involved in the original
transaction, the extension of credit, and the creation of the
TILA violation. 99 In Cenance, the Court found that such
conduct on the part of the assignee led to the classification of
the assignee as an original creditor.200 Despite Congress's redefinition, the Court's reasoning in Cenance is still logical: an
assignee who has a high level of control over the original
transaction and is instrumental in creating the TILA
violation acts more like an original creditor and should not
escape liability just because it is not defined as the original
creditor. To allow an assignee to escape liability simply
because Congress changed the definition of creditor elevates
form over substance.

197. See PRIDGEN, supra note 49, § 5:16, at 317 ("This means that assignees
will be liable for very few TILA violations."); see, e.g., Perry v. Household Retail,
268 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir. 2001); Balderos v. City Chevrolet, 214 F.3d 849 (7th
Cir. 2000) (stating that there was no assignee liability where the additional
charge only passed on to credit customers); Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 160 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that dealer up-charge was not

apparent on face of the document); Walker v. Wallace Auto Sales, Inc., 155 F.3d
927 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining that actual knowledge was insufficient to
create assignee liability); Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp.
2d 563 (E.D. Va. 2001) (deciding that there was no assignee liability where
component of the cash price was incorrect); Brown v. Coleman Invs., 993 F.
Supp. 416 (M.D. La. 1998) (stating that license fee up-charge did not create
assignee liability).
198. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, 12.06, at 859-60.
199. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155 (1981).
200. Id.
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Moreover, TILA's definition of creditor seems even more
irrational in the context of "spurious" open-end credit
violations. In Perry v. Household Retail Services, Inc., the
consumer in a spurious open-end credit transaction contended
that the finance company was "far more than just an
'assignee' [of the] transaction."2' 1 Rather, he argued that the
creditor and assignee were "active participants in a scheme to
evade TILA disclosure requirements" and introduced evidence
demonstrating the assignee's control over grants and denials
of credit. °2 The court held that the assignee's awareness was
sufficient to make the violation apparent on the face of the
document.203
However, most courts find that a close association
between the creditor and assignee does not make a violation
apparent on the face of the contract.0 4 In Mayfield v. General
Electric Capital Corp., the defendant was in the business of
contracting with merchants to finance the purchases of
consumer goods and services. 20 5

The assignee provided the

merchants with all of the credit forms and instructed the
merchants on how to complete them. °6 The contracts were
subsequently assigned to the assignee once it approved the
credit.2 °7 The consumer alleged that the finance company was
liable for the violations because it was intimately involved in
the transaction and because there would not have been a
transaction at all without the finance company's actions.2"'
The court held that the assignee was not liable since the
consumers did not allege that there was a violation on the
face of the disclosure and because TILA's amended definition
of creditor does not encompass arrangers of credit. °9
As the Mayfield and Perry cases demonstrate, finance
companies commonly play a much greater role in TILA
violations than simply that of an assignee. 21 0

Finance

201. Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (M.D.
Ala. 1996).

202. Id.
203. Id. at 1376.
204. See Mayfield v. General Electric Capital Corp., No. 97 Civ. 2786, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048, at *14-17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999).
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *11.
209. Id. at *14-17.
210. See Perry v. Household Retail Servs. Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1370, 1375 (M.D.
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companies often develop and implement the financing
scheme, recruiting merchants and dealers who then solicit
buyers.2 1' In addition, finance companies create the forms,
train the sellers, and retain complete control over the credit12
process, including the ability to grant or deny financing.
Despite the finance company's heavy involvement in the
credit process, the law nevertheless does not consider the
finance company a creditor because it is not the entity to
which the contract is initially payable.2 13 The merchants and
dealers are considered the "original creditor" even when all
they do 21is4 arrange for the immediate assignment of the
When one combines this absurd definition of
contract.
creditor with TILA's narrow provision for assignee liability,
the result is that an assignee may reap the benefit of a TILA
violation by retaining control of the transaction while at the
same time escaping TILA liability altogether.1 5
B. Assignee Knowledge
While an assignee may only be liable for those violations
that are apparent on the face of the contract, it is unclear
whether an assignee's knowledge also creates assignee
liability because the violation is "apparent on the face of the
disclosure statement."21 6 Many consumers have attempted to
argue that an assignee's knowledge of the TILA violation
makes the violation apparent and therefore makes the
assignee liable for the TILA violation. 217 However, most
courts hold that an assignee's knowledge of the TILA
violation does not create assignee liability.218

Ala. 1996) (describing finance company as intimately involved); Mayfield v.
General Electric Capital Corp., No. 97 Civ. 2786, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (demonstrating finance company created forms
that had the TILA violation).
211. See Perry, 953 F. Supp. at 1375; Mayfield, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048,
at *2.
212. See Perry, 953 F. Supp. at 1375; Mayfield, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048,
at *2.
213. See Perry, 953 F. Supp. at 1375; Mayfield, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048,
at *2.
214. Rohner, supra note 83, at 1011.
215. See, e.g., Mayfield, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4048.
216. Griffith, supra note 5, at 311 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (2006)).
217. See infra Part IV.B.1.
218. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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1. Courts Find That Assignees' Knowledge of TILA
Violations Is Insufficient to Create Liability
a. Assignee Knowledge from the Business Practice
Consumers have argued that an assignee's knowledge of
an industry creditor's common business practice that violates
TILA made that violation apparent on the face of the
contract. In Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., the consumer
argued that the assignee's awareness of the creditor's
business practice of retaining part of the extended warranty
made the violation apparent on the face of the contract.219
The consumer asserted that as a sophisticated and active
participant in the market, the finance company must have
known of the common industry practice whereby car dealers
retained a part of the extended warranty charge as a
commission."' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit rejected this argument, refusing to adopt a rule that
would "impose a duty of inquiry on financial institutions that
serve as assignees." 221

The Taylor holding signifies that

knowledge of a common practice in an industry may not make
a violation apparent on the face of the document.222 Other
courts that2 have addressed this question follow similar
reasoning.

1

b.
Other
knowledge
documents

Assignee Knowledge from PublicDocuments
consumers have argued that an assignee's
of a TILA violation from publicly available
creates assignee liability. In Green v. Levis

Motors, Green purchased a car from a dealer. 224 The retail

installment contract listed the amount paid to the state for
the license fee as forty dollars, but in fact, the amount paid to
the state was only twenty-two dollars.225 The court in Green
found that the dealer's up-charge violated TILA.226

The

219. Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., 150 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1998).
220. Id. at 694.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 198 (3rd
Cir. 2000); Green v. Levis Motors, Inc., 179 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 1999); Ellis
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1998).
224. Green, 179 F.3d at 287.
225. Id. at 287-88.
226. Id. at 294.
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consumer argued that the assignee was also liable because it
should have known that there was an up-charge on the state
license fee. 227 The state license fee table was a public
document, and therefore Green contended that as an
experienced player in the credit industry, the finance
company should have been aware of the up-charge. 228 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that since
the fee table was not an assigned document in the
transaction, and because TILA does not contemplate the
subjective knowledge of the assignee, the assignee was not
liable. 229 Hence, implied knowledge from public documents is
likewise insufficient to create liability.23 °
c.

Assignee Knowledge from Assigned Documents

Consumers have also argued that a TILA violation
apparent to an assignee through documents assigned during
the transaction should create assignee liability. TILA creates
liability for violations that can be determined from the face of
231
the disclosure statement and other documents assigned.
Thus the phrase "and other documents assigned" can be
23 2
critical for a consumer who seeks to prove assignee liability.
In Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the
consumer sought to show that the violation was apparent on
the face of the contract based on the finance company's
knowledge of the violation from assigned documents.23 3 In
Ellis, the consumers purchased a car and an extended
warranty, which were both financed through a retail
installment contract.23 4 The contract listed the price paid to
the mechanic for the extended warranty as $1195, but the
actual amount paid was considerably less.2 35 The contract
was immediately assigned to GMAC, who then paid the

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
See Green v. Levis Motors, Inc., 179 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
15 U.S.C. § 1641(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
232. NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 7.3.2.2, at 450 (5th ed.
2003).
233. Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir.
1998).
234. Id. at 705.
235. Id.
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mechanic a lesser amount for the extended warranty.236
Thus, GMAC was assigned the document, which stated that
the extended warranty cost $1195, and yet GMAC wrote the
check for a lesser amount. This inconsistency demonstrated
to GMAC that the warranty cost stated on the contract was
inflated and therefore that the contract contained a typical
"hidden finance charge" TILA violation. 237

The consumer

argued that the misstated cost of the extended warranty,
where the assignee knew that the amount paid was different
than that on the loan document, equated to actual knowledge
of the violation. 2" However, the Eleventh Circuit held that
where the evidence is extraneous to the disclosure statement,
there is no assignee liability.239 Thus, although the assignee
had knowledge because of the documents assigned, the court
held that this knowledge was not sufficient to find assignee
liability.24 °
d. Assignee's "Special"Knowledge
Another manner in which consumers have attempted to
impose assignee liability is by arguing that an assignee's
special relationship with the original creditor demonstrates
knowledge of the TILA violation. The finance company in
Balderos v. City Chevrolet charged the dealer a fifty-dollar
acceptance fee for every contract it financed, but waived the
fee if the dealer sold a membership to a club owned by the
finance company. 241' The actual value of this membership was
ten dollars, but the dealer charged consumers sixty dollars,
236. Id. at 709-10.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709-10 (11th
Cir. 1998). This decision has been questioned by commentators. See NATL
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 232, § 7.3.2.2, at 451 ("The court stated
erroneously that it could not 'resort to evidence or documents extraneous to the
disclosure statement,' without mentioning the statutory mandate that it
consider the 'other documents assigned.' "); Griffith, supra note 5, at 315 ("The
court in Ellis may have confused matters somewhat by referring to Taylor's
limiting the inquiry to defects that can be gleaned from 'the face of the
documents themselves.' It is unclear, therefore, whether the court's lack of
interest in 'documents extraneous to the disclosure statement' can be reconciled
with its reference to Taylor, especially when the plaintiffs supported the
relevance of the related loan documents in determining the apparent
violation.").
240. See Ellis, 160 F.3d at 709.
241. Balderos v. City Chevrolet, 214 F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 2000).
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rolling the acceptance fee into the transaction without
disclosing it to the buyer.242 The consumer alleged that the
extra fifty-dollar cost of the membership was a hidden finance
charge in violation of TILA.248 He also argued that the
finance company was liable because it was apparent on the
face of the contract that the sixty-dollar membership fee,
which it knew to be far in excess of the ten-dollar cost, was an
undisclosed finance charge.2" The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that something "apparent" only by
virtue of special knowledge is not apparent on the face of the
contract itself.24 5 The court found that despite its special
knowledge, the finance company could not tell by looking at
the contract that its acceptance fee had been passed to the
246
consumer.

Consumers have also argued that when the dealer and
the assignee are under common ownership and control, the
assignee should be liable because of this special relationship.
In Furge v. Evergreen Finance Co., the consumer argued that
because the assignee and the dealer were under common
247
ownership and control, the TILA violation was "apparent."
The court held that "nothing in TILA . . . indicates that
allegations of actual knowledge based on common ownership
supports assignee liability under the TILA."24' The holdings
in Balderos and Furge demonstrate that courts decline to find
assignee liability even where the assignees have special
knowledge of the violation.
e.

Assignee's Actual Knowledge

Finally, consumers have attempted to convince courts
that assignee liability should attach where a consumer can
prove that an assignee had actual knowledge of a TILA
2 49
violation. The facts in Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp.
are similar to those in Ellis. As in Ellis, the dealer in
Ramadan inflated the cost of the warranty in the contract
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 853.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Furge v. Evergreen Fin. Co., No. 97-C5176, 1998 WL 729624 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 16, 1998).
248. Id. at *2.
249. Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194 (3rd Cir. 2000).
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and immediately assigned the contract, and the assignee paid
the true/lower cost of the warranty to the mechanic, revealing
to the assignee the hidden finance charge.25 ° Ramadan
attempted to draw a distinction between constructive
knowledge, which she contended would be insufficient to
support assignee liability, and actual knowledge, which she
asserted was sufficient.25 1 The court held that there was no
support for such a differentiation.2 2 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that Congress's
removal of the "without knowledge" language from the
assignee liability provision in TILA demonstrated Congress's
intent for actual knowledge to be independent of that which
could be discerned from the disclosure statement.2 3 Based on
this reasoning, actual knowledge obtained from sources other
than the disclosure statement is insufficient to trigger
assignee liability.
2. Courts'Reluctance to Find Liability Where There is
Knowledge of the Violation Is Contrary to the Purpose
of TILA
Failure to impose assignee liability where there is
knowledge of the violation diminishes TILA's purpose.
Courts fail to impose assignee liability where consumers have
shown that assignees have knowledge of TILA violations
through the creditors' business practices, public documents,
documents assigned in the transaction, a special relationship
with a creditor, and even where there is actual knowledge.25 4
The courts' reluctance to find liability where the assignee's
knowledge is relevant impedes its enforcement of TILA
because finance companies are able to facilitate creditor
compliance with TILA.
In the cases where courts found that knowledge is
insufficient to establish liability, the courts' reasoning is
based on Congress's rationale for limiting assignee liability.
This rationale-that an assignee should not be liable where it
can neither detect nor control the violation and that an
assignee does not have a duty to look beyond the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 196.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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disclosure 2 5 -- does not make sense where an assignee has
knowledge of the violation.2 5 6 Where knowledge of a TILA
violation already exists, there is no further duty of inquiry,
and the assignee has control over its liability for TILA
violations since it can simply decide not take contracts that it
knows contain TILA violations.5 7
Moreover, where an assignee has actual knowledge of a
TILA violation, he is in a position to promote the purposes of
TILA by requiring its enforcement. 'Through their financing
function, assignees are thus in a position to insist that credit
sellers or lenders 'clean up their act' and maintain proper
disclosure systems."25
Thus, this rationale-which is the
reason assignees are liable when a violation is apparent on
the face of the document-also applies when an assignee has
actual knowledge.259 If an assignee refuses to contract with a
seller whom it knows has committed an actual violation, the
assignee would enforce TILA's purpose by requiring the
correct disclosures. On the other hand, if an assignee has
knowledge and is not liable, TILA's goals are negated.2 °
This analysis-that liability for assignees who have
actual knowledge enforces the purposes of TILA--can also be
extended to encompass constructive knowledge. The creation
of a duty of inquiry on the part of the assignee would further
enhance the objectives of TILA. An assignee who faces
liability because it had, or easily could have had, acquired
knowledge of a violation from public records and failed to
insist that the creditor comply with TILA is in a better
255. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, 12.06, at 854.
256. Griffith, supra note 5, at 317. ("A knowledgeable assignee would have no
cause to inquire about the possibility of a breach because he would already be
informed about the violation. The Act pretends to limit this liability to
assignees who have to seek information from the assigned documents and
excuses the assignee who can learn nothing from the face of those documents. If
the assignee's knowledge of the facts does not require this assignee to go further
in search of truth, then it should be irrelevant whether the violation is
apparent.").
257. See id.
258. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2,
12.06, at 854.
259. Id. ("[lit is clearly intended that assignees share with original creditors
the responsibility to see that TIL disclosures were properly made.").
260. Griffith, supra note 5, at 352 ("[Olne may wonder about the utility of
protecting an assignee who knows about a violation on the disclosure statement.
In that event, the 'apparentness' criterion lacks vitality, and there is nothing
that promotes the objectives of Truth in Lending by allowing the assignee to
hide behind the statutory defense.").
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position than a consumer to promote compliance. Finance
companies engage in repeat transactions, enabling them to
identify TILA violations with relative ease. By contrast,
consumers lack sophistication in credit markets and are
therefore less familiar with TILA's requirements.2 6 1
Expansion of assignee liability could further the goals of TILA
by requiring that fmancers be familiar with the practices of
the industry and holding them liable for violations of which
they knew or should have known.
C. The Holder Rule's Effect on Assignee Liability
Where a consumer contract includes the Holder Notice,
the question arises whether the Holder Rule subjects
assignees to TILA liability regardless of whether or not the
violation is apparent.2 6 2 Because the Holder Rule requires
credit sellers to include a clause stating that the assignee is
subject to all claims which the debtor could assert against the
original creditor, it is unclear whether TILA's assignee
liability provision should trump the Holder Notice.26 3 Some
courts have found as a matter of contract law that consumer
claims and defenses are preserved between the parties.26 4
However, the majority of courts have held that an FTC
regulation cannot overrule a federal statute. 260 These courts
reason that TILA's assignee liability is explicit and that TILA
thus displaces any contradictory agency rule.2 66 Experts have
similarly disagreed on this point.26 7
1.

Most Courts Find the Holder Rule Is Abrogated

Most courts hold that TILA abrogates the Holder Notice.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
262. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2,

12.06, at 859.

263. See, e.g., Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 200 (3rd
Cir. 2000).
264. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2,

12.06, at 859.

265. Id. at 860.
266. Id. at 859-60.
267. Peterson, supra note 57, at 2241 n.339 (suggesting a comparison
between NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 232, § 7.3.10, at 455 n.201
("[It seems likely that 'all claims and defenses' in the Rule means 'all,' not 'all
except Truth in Lending .... '") and ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2, 12.06,
at 859-60 ("Congress wrote the current version of section 131 of the TIL Act
aware of the existence of the FTC rule, yet expressly limited assignee liability to
facial violation. This must be taken as clear congressional intent to restrict the
assignee's exposure to those violations described in the statute.")).
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in
Taylor that the Holder Notice was included in the contract
because of agency regulation (the Holder Rule) and was not
the subject of bargaining between the parties.268 Therefore,
the court reasoned that the Holder Notice must be read in
light of other laws-including TILA-which impose narrower
liability for an assignee than does the Holder Rule.26 9 Despite
the abrogation of the Holder Rule in this context, the court
reasoned that the Holder Notice continues to fill a valuable
role by reiterating the right of buyers to withhold payment
from assignees for claims other than TILA.270 Ultimately,
Taylor held that the language required by the FTC could not
override the express language of TILA 1
Further, courts continue to hold that TILA abrogates the
Holder Notice even where consumers argue that the only way
to give meaning to the inclusion of the Holder Notice in the
contract is to find that the assignee intentionally included the
notice. In Ellis, the consumer conceded that a regulation
cannot trump the plain language of a statute, but argued that
the only way to give meaning to the Holder Notice in the
contract was to accept that by the inclusion of the Holder
Notice, the finance company contracted to assume greater
liability than the law requires.2 7 2 However, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that no evidence
showed the finance company's intent to relinquish TILA's
protections because the FTC mandates that the Holder Notice
be inserted into every consumer credit contract.27 3 Therefore,
since the Holder Notice is part of the contract by force of law
rather than by the intent of the parties, it must be read in
light of other laws that modify its reach.2 74
Courts find that TILA abrogates the Holder Notice even
where consumers argue that to escape liability, assignees
should include a disclaimer of the Holder Notice.
In
Ramadan, the consumers claimed that the Holder Notice was
not a truly involuntary inclusion in the contract because
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
1998).
273.
274.

Taylor v. Quality Hyundai, Inc., 150 F.3d 689, 693 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id.
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Hyundai, the assignee, could have carved out an exception to
TILA liability in the Holder Notice by inserting a clause in
the contract stating that despite the Holder Notice, the
assignee did not intend to be subject to TILA claims.27
Ramadan, the consumer, thus claimed that because Hyundai
chose not to "carve out an exception," Hyundai intended to be
subject to all claims, including TILA 6
Furthermore,
Ramadan argued that there was no justification for looking
beyond the plain language of the contract to the regulatory
history surrounding the Holder Notice's inclusion, which
showed that the inclusion was mandated by law. 277 According
to Ramadan, the financer " 'cannot now win relief from the
specific language of its own contract simply because it claims
not to have meant what it said.' ,"7
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed
with this argument, stating that the inclusion of the Holder
Rule did not contemplate deviations or modifications of the
Holder Notice.2 79 Moreover, the court found that because
there is an "irreconcilable conflict" between the Holder Notice
and TILA's assignee liability, the court must look at the
regulatory background regarding the inclusion of the Holder
Notice, which shows that the inclusion was mandated by the
FTC regulation.28 0
2.

Other Courts Do Not Find the FTC Holder Rule
Abrogated

A few courts find that TILA does not abrogate the Holder
Notice. In Cox v. FirstNationalBank of Cincinnati,the court
held an assignee liable for a TILA violation. 28 ' The court
found the assignee liable not because the violation was
apparent on the face of the contract, but because the claim
against the seller was valid by virtue of the Holder Rule's

275. Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 200-01 (3rd Cir.
2000).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 202.
278. Id. (quoting Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729, 734
(3d. Cir. 1989)).
279. Id. at 201.
280. Id. at 202.
281. Cox v. First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, 633 F. Supp. 236, 239 (S.D. Ohio
1986).
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claim preservation provision in the contract.2 2
Similarly, the court in Perry found the claim preservation
clause sufficient to create assignee liability. 2s Although the
court found that the violation was apparent on the face of the
contract, it alternately found that where "the TILA violation
alleged herein is a valid claim against Home Video, the seller,
it is also a valid claim against HRSI, the assignee, by virtue
of the claim preservation provision in the contract."',
The dissenting judge in the Ramadan case also reasoned
that the Holder Notice was not abrogated. 2 5 This judge
disagreed with the majority, claiming that the inclusion of the
Holder Notice justified assignee liability. 286 The dissent took
issue with the majority's logic-since the law mandates its
inclusion, the Holder Notice was coerced; and since the
Holder Notice is in "irreconcilable conflict" with TILA and
regulations cannot trump statutory mandates, the Holder
Notice must give way.2 87 Although the dissent conceded that
the
majority's
argument
had
"unquestionably
a
straightforward
simplicity
which
ma[de]
it
quite
compelling," 288 it found that the analysis effectively ignored
the interests of the consumers, to whom the Holder Notice is
addressed, and instead only considered the interests of
282. Id.
283. Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (M.D.
Ala. 1996).
284. Id.
285. Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 203 (3rd Cir. 2000)
(Pollak, J., dissenting).
286. Id.
287. Id. ("As I understand the court's opinion, its determination that the
Holder Notice is nugatory is the product of the following syllogism: (1) The
Holder Notice appeared in Ms. Ramadan's finance agreement (and, one must
suppose, hundreds of thousands of other finance agreements) not as a provision
voluntarily acquiesced in by the seller and the assignee finance company, but in
compliance with a regulation of the Federal Trade Commission making it 'an
unfair and deceptive trade act or practice ... for a seller, directly or indirectly,
to . .. [take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain the
[Holder Notice] provision .

. . .'

(2) In determining the scope of civil liability for

violations of the TILA, Congress has limited the liability of an assignee of a
finance agreement to violations 'apparent on the face of the disclosure
statement, except where the assignment was involuntary.' (3) Since the Holder
Notice's inclusion in the Ramadan finance agreement was, in the court's view,
coerced by the FTC; and the since the Holder Notice, as prescribed by the FTC
regulation, is in the court's view, in 'irreconcilable conflict' with the TILA; and
since 'regulations cannot trump statutory mandates,' the Holder Notice must
give way.") (citations omitted).
288. Id.
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Congress, the FTC, and the assignees. 2 19 The dissenting
judge reasoned that the problem with not considering the
consumer is that "it is the Ramadans of the world to whom
the Holder Notice is addressed. It is the Ramadans of the
world who can be taken to have relied on what the Hyundais
of the world have, by accepting the assignment of finance
agreements, said to them."2 90 Although Congress may have
meant to abrogate the Holder Rule, finance companies that
continue to accept agreements that include the Holder Notice
should be held to that representation. 9' Because consumers
are not aware of the interplay between the Holder Notice and
TILA, and finance companies are,29 2 the dissent found that
"an assignee finance company that failed to insist on
inclusion of an appropriate warning adjacent to the Holder
Notice should be estopped from invoking the Holder Notice in
litigation." 29 3 The dissent concluded that by requiring this
sort of warning, the reasonable expectations of consumers
would not be frustrated.29 4
3.

Finding the Holder Rule Abrogated Frustrates
Consumer Expectation

Although the majority of courts hold that TILA
completely abrogates the Holder Rule, this limitation on
assignee liability frustrates consumer expectation.29 5 Where
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 204 (3rd Cir. 2000)
(Pollak, J., dissenting).
292. Id. ("A finance company has no ground for supposing that more than
one in tens of thousands of purchaser-borrowers (the Ramadans of the world)
will be conversant with the interplay between the FTC regulation and TILA.").
293. Id. ("I will not argue (although I think the argument could plausibly be
made) that by now the Holder Notices that remain in place are there because
finance companies, well aware that Congress in 1980 relieved them of any
administratively mandated liability, have decided to accept liability as a
contractual matter. To the contrary, I am prepared to accept, arguendo, that
the Holder Notice remains an un-bargained for ingredient of the standard
finance agreement. But it seems to me that a finance company, feeling that the
Holder Notice is in place via force majeure and intending to defend against its
applicability in any litigation that may arise, should, before accepting
assignment of a finance agreement, insist that the Holder Notice be garlanded
with caveat emptors that warn the purchaser-borrower of the finance company's
view that the 1980 TILA amendment robs the Holder Notice of substantive
effect.").
294. Id.
295. See Peterson, supra note 57, at 2241.
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courts find that the Holder Rule is abrogated, they reason
that the Holder Notice is only included in consumer contracts
because the FTC requires its inclusion.2 96 However, it is
uncontested that parties may contract to expand liability.2 97
As suggested in the Ramadan dissent, what these opinions do
not address is the effect of the Holder Notice's inclusion on
the expectations of the consumer.2 98 When courts find that
the protections afforded by the Holder Rule still apply, they
do so because of their concern regarding consumer
expectations. 9 With the current state of the law, there is no
way for consumers to know whether the Holder Notice has
been included because of an assignee's intent to expand
liability or only because the Holder Rule requires it.300 Thus,
TILA's limitation on assignee liability and its interaction with
the Holder Rule has created a conundrum for courts.
V. PROPOSAL
In light of TILA's goals to enable consumers to shop for
the best credit, to protect consumers against unfair billing,
and to police the credit market, Congress should amend the
Truth in Lending Act to expand assignee liability. Assignees
should be liable for all TILA violations, not just those
apparent on the face of the contract. This expanded liability
would be similar to the liability created by the Holder Rule
and HOEPA. However, the expanded provision should also
allow for an affirmative defense. The assignee could escape
liability, as it can in HOEPA, if it proves that a reasonable
person exercising due diligence could not have determined
that a TILA violation existed based on the disclosure
statement, documents assigned, a special relationship with
the assignee, public documents, or business practices.
Furthermore, in light of the conflict between the statement of
the Holder Notice and TILA's assignee liability provision, an
assignee must demonstrate that it has inserted a provision

296. See Ramadan, 229 F.3d at 200-01.
297. See Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709 (11th
Cir. 1998).
298. See Ramadan, 229 F.3d at 203-04 (Pollak, J., dissenting).
299. See id. at 204; Perry v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1370,
1376 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Cox v. First Natl Bank of Cincinnati, 633 F. Supp. 236,
239 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
300. See Ramadan, 229 F.3d at 204 (Pollak, J., dissenting).
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adjacent to the Holder Notice warning consumers that the
assignee is not liable for TILA violations absent actual or
constructive knowledge in order to escape liability through
the affirmative defense. This expansion of liability would
resolve the problems created by TILA's narrow definition of
"creditor," the limited scope of assignee liability, and the
interaction of TILA with the Holder Notice.
A. The Definition of Creditor Would No Longer Allow
Assignees That Participatein CreatingTILA Violations to
Escape Liability
With expanded assignee liability, an assignee who is
intricately involved in the original transaction and
participated in creating the TILA violation could no longer
escape liability. The assignee would be unable to escape
liability not because TILA would classify it as an original
creditor, but because the expanded assignee liability
provision creates liability for those assignees that know of
and participate in creating the violation.
Yet without a change in the definition of creditor, the
current definition would still be somewhat absurd because it
would continue to classify a dealer as the original creditor
although all it did was arrange for the immediate assignment
of the contract. However, the Supreme Court's logic in
Cenance could be followed, rather than swept aside, because
those assignees that act more like original creditors would be
treated as such and would not be able to escape liability.
Hence form would no longer be elevated over substance
simply because Congress changed the definition of creditor.
B. TILA Would No LongerAllow Assignees with Knowledge
of the Violation to Escape Liability
An expanded assignee liability provision would create
liability when the assignee has actual knowledge or even
constructive knowledge-gained through either the business
practices within an industry, publicly available documents, a
special relationship with the creditor, or the documents
assigned in the transaction. Although Congress and the
courts expressed concern for limiting assignee liability where
he can neither detect nor control the violation, 0 ' there is a
301. See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 2,

'1 12.06,

at 854.
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strong argument that the positive gains from a stronger
enforcement of TILA's policy goals outweighs the cost of
imposing an affirmative duty of inquiry on assignees. First,
where an assignee has actual knowledge of a violation, no
duty of inquiry is created and an assignee already has the
option to decline the assignment.
Further, imposing an affirmative duty of inquiry on
assignees when knowledge of a violation is available through
familiarity with the business practices of an industry,
publicly available documents, the activities of creditors with
whom the assignee has an especially close relationship, and
the documents assigned in the transaction is minimally
burdensome. Because assignees make repeated transactions
within the market, they are likely already aware of the
business practices of creditors within the industry and with
the related publicly available documents, like a license fee
table. For those assignees that have an especially close
relationship with the creditor, like in the Furge case where
the creditor and assignee were under the same ownership and
control, the likelihood of actual knowledge of a violation is
high and an affirmative duty to inquire would not be a large
burden because of the existing closeness of the relationship.
Moreover, an affirmative duty to examine the documents
assigned in a transaction is also not overly burdensome and is
likely already a requirement under existing law.3 °2
A duty of inquiry on the part of the assignee would assist
in accomplishing TILA's goals of disclosure because an
assignee who faces liability under an expanded assignee
liability provision would insist that creditors comply with
TILA. Assignees are in a better position than a consumer to
promote this type of compliance, not only because of their
greater experience and sophistication in the market, but also
302. TILA currently states that an assignee may be liable for violations
apparent on the face of the disclosure statement and other documents assigned.
15 U.S.C. § 1641(a)(1) (2006). The court's refusal in Ellis to impose liability
where the violation was apparent from other documents seems erroneous. See
NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 232, § 7.3.2.2 ("The court stated
erroneously that it could not 'resort to evidence or documents extraneous to the
disclosure statement,' without mentioning the statutory mandate that it
consider the 'other documents assigned.' " (quoting Ellis v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 709-10 (11th Cir. 1998))); supra note 239.
Thus an expansion of assignee liability would make clear to courts that
assignees are liable for violations apparent from other documents assigned and
would help prevent erroneous decisions like the one in Ellis.
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because of the leverage they have with the threat to
discontinue business with unscrupulous creditors.
Finally, an expanded assignee liability provision could
still contain an affirmative defense for assignees who can
prove that a reasonable person exercising due diligence could
not have determined that a TILA violation existed based on
the disclosure statement, documents assigned, a special
relationship with the assignee, public documents, or business
practices. This affirmative defense addresses those concerns
Congress articulated when limiting assignee liability with the
Simplification Act.
Because of the affirmative defense,
assignees would not be liable for violations that they could
not become aware of after a reasonable inquiry or for which
they could not control. However, by expanding the assignee
liability provision to create liability, but allowing for the
defense, the burden shifts to the assignee to show its own lack
of knowledge. Shifting the burden from the consumer to the
assignee is fair because the assignee, rather than the
consumer, is the party who will possess the critical facts and
evidence as to whether the assignee knew or did not know of
the violation.
C. TILA's Interaction with the Holder Notice Would No
Longer FrustrateConsumer Expectation
An expanded assignee liability provision coupled with a
warning to consumers on TILA's limitations of assignee
liability would alleviate the "irreconcilable conflict"-as
described by the Ramadan majority-between the Holder
Notice and TILA. Presently, TILA's assignee liability rule
contradicts consumers' expectations of assignee liability
because it is in opposition with the statement in the Holder
Notice. However, if TILA's assignee liability provision is
expanded, assignees will be liable for TILA violations unless
the assignee can assert the affirmative defense. Additionally,
if the contract contains the Holder Notice, the assignee will be
unable to escape liability through the affirmative defense if
the assignee did not insert a warning to the consumer
adjacent to the Holder Notice. The expansion of assignee
liability and the requirement of the warning would ensure
that consumer expectations are not frustrated by the
interaction between the Holder Rule and TILA.
This part of the proposal-the requirement of a warning
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adjacent to the Holder Notice-is informed by the reasoning
of the Ramadan dissent.
As that dissenting opinion
illustrates, when the Holder Notice is included in the
contract, courts have a mechanism to impose assignee
liability even if Congress does not expand assignee liability in
TILA. The Ramadan dissent is well reasoned and delineates
an equally plausible interpretation of the interaction between
the Holder Notice and TILA. Thus, if Congress does not
choose to expand assignee liability, courts can still promote
the purpose of TILA and refuse to frustrate consumer
expectation by imposing assignee liability where the Holder
Notice is included in the contract without an adjacent
warning to the consumer. A court could adopt the reasoning
of the Ramadan dissent and find that the finance company is
estopped from invoking the Holder Notice in litigation
because of the disparity of knowledge between the finance
company who "will be conversant with the interplay between
the FTC regulation and TILA" and the consumer, who
typically is not."'3 Another option for a court is to give effect
to the Holder Notice because it is a bargained-for ingredient
in the contract. As sophisticated players in the market,
finance companies are well aware of the interaction of TILA
with the Holder Rule. Because of this knowledge-Congress
relieved assignees of liability imposed by the Holder Rule by
creating narrow assignee liability in TILA-those assignees
who continue to insert the Holder Notice into their contracts
without an adjacent warning have decided to accept expanded
liability as a contractual matter. Thus, even if Congress does
not expand assignee liability in TILA itself, courts have
another judicial tool to alleviate consumer frustration created
by the interaction of the TILA and the Holder Notice.
D. ExpandedAssignee Liability Would Promote TILA's
Policy and Goals
Expanding assignee liability would promote TILA's goal
of requiring meaningful disclosure of the cost of credit. The
policy reasons specified by the FTC for promulgating the
Holder Rule and by Congress in enacting HOEPA also
support expanding assignee liability for TILA violations.
303. See Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 204 (2000)
(Pollak, J., dissenting).
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Finance companies that continually work within the market
are better situated than consumers to recognize violations
and to pressure unscrupulous sellers to reform." 4 Without
assignee liability, the cost of the violation is carried directly
by the unlucky buyer. °5
Additionally, the success resulting from the expansion of
assignee liability through HOEPA demonstrates that
expanded assignee liability is the best mechanism for
regulating predatory lending practices and thus TILA
violations as well." 6 Congress did not enact HOEPA until the
problem of predatory lending was out of control. °7
By
expanding assignee liability now, Congress could avoid a
catastrophe like the one currently plaguing the sub-prime
mortgage market by proactively implementing a solution.
Instead of encouraging assignees to look the other way or
participate in the violation, expanded liability encourages
assignees to police the market. The devastating effects
caused by predatory lending now apparent in the sub-prime
mortgage market give further support to the expansion of
3 0
assignee liability.
The effect of this expansion would not only include the
desired policy effects of spreading the cost and policing the
market, but would also produce the practical effect of giving a
consumer a remedy where the seller has gone bankrupt or
absconded.
Expanded assignee liability would allow a
consumer like Maria Sanchez to recover where the original
creditor went bankrupt and the finance company had actual
knowledge of the TILA violation.
VI. CONCLUSION

As Maria Sanchez's story and this analysis demonstrate,
Truth in Lending violations remain prevalent and continue to
have a detrimental effect on consumers. The limited liability
that TILA places on assignees not only allows assignees to
benefit from violations, but also allows violations to continue
ubiquitously. An expansion of liability would further the
purpose of TILA and would prevent the disastrous
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
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supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
Keyfetz, supra note 118, at 152.
id.
id.
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consequences of predatory lending like those of the sub-prime
mortgage market. The purposes of the Truth in Lending Act
and fairness to consumers require that Congress expand
assignee liability to put an end to TILA violations and provide
the Marias of the world a remedy against assignees who
violate TILA's mandate.

